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ABSTRACT 
 
An objective of this study is to investigate the difference of earnings management before financing by capital financing 
purposes. Two main methods of financing directly in capital markets are seasoned equity offerings (hereafter ‘SEO’) 
and issuing bonds (hereafter ‘BOND’). The purposes of financing are largely classified into working capital and 
investment capital. This study investigates whether the firms that need to finance for working capital are more 
motivated for earnings management than the firms that need to finance for investment capital. The results show that 
discretionary accruals before financing for working capital are greater than financing for investment capital for both 
SEO and BOND.  
 
 
Keywords: Earnings Management; Capital Financing; Financing Purpose; Working Capital; Investment Capital 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
irms borrow from banks or raise capital directly from capital markets when they are lack of capital. 
Two main methods of direct financing in capital markets are SEO and BOND. Firms are required to 
disclose the purposes when raising capital directly from capital markets. The purposes of financing by 
SEO are largely classified into working capital and investment capital and the purposes of financing by BOND are 
largely classified into working capital, investment capital, and refinancing. A number of studies have explored the 
relationship between financing and earnings management in accounting researches. Prior studies have demonstrated 
that the firms are greatly motivated for earnings management before SEO while the motivation is not clear when the 
firms issue bonds and the effects are indirect. However, studies about earnings management by financing purposes 
have not been done. A probable reason is that none of financial databases provides SEO and BOND data by financing 
purposes. In this study, data about SEO by purposes were manually collected from KIND (Korea Investor’s Network 
for Disclosure) system of Korea Exchange and data about BOND by purposes were also manually collected from 
BONDWEB system of EDAILY. This paper aims to validate the difference in amount of discretionary accruals before 
financing by capital financing purposes based on the assumption that the causes of earnings management should be 
different by financing purposes. The causes of earnings management for the firms that finance for working capital 
appear to be different from the firms that finance for investment capital. Refinancing is excluded from the analysis 
since BOND includes financing for it. Firms issuing equity and bonds at the same time and the firms financing for 
various purposes at once are also excluded from the analysis. Samples are the firms listed in Korea Exchange from 
1992 to 2014 with fiscal year end of December excluding financial firms. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), Shivakumar (2000), and Yoon & Miller (2002) claimed the 
firms issuing equity adjust discretionary accruals before financing to raise earnings. They asserted firms conduct 
earnings management to enhance the stock price before SEO and increased stock price accordingly facilitates issuing 
equity per se and is also beneficial to existing shareholders. Whereas, Lee & Kim (2010), Liu et al. (2010), and Lee 
& Heo (2013) failed to draw consistent conclusions in the investigations whether firms use earnings management 
before issuing bonds. Hong (2016), Hong & Lee (2016) directly compared earnings management before financing of 
the firms issuing equity with the firms issuing bonds, and the results showed that significantly more earnings 
management were detected in the firms issuing equity than the firms issuing bonds. This study sets up Hypothesis 1 
F 
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to retest the identical analysis of Hong (2016), Hong & Lee (2016) except for the sample of bonds for refinancing. 
Hypothesis 1 has already been verified in previous studies, this study retests it to develop Hypothesis 2 & 3. Ahn et 
al. (2015) claimed the causes of earnings management vary in different SEO types. They argued that the upward 
adjustment of earnings management in the firms issuing equity with public offering is greater than in the firms issuing 
equity with right offering, while there is no significant difference noted between the firms issuing equity with private 
placement to the third party and the firms issuing equity with right offering. They also claimed that as inside 
participants increase, more downward adjustment of earnings management was detected when the firms issuing equity 
with private placement to the third party. As shown in the case of loss avoiding earnings management, if a firm is 
facing a particular situation, it would be more motivated for earnings management. Generally the situations that firms 
need to finance for working capital should be more urgent than the firms that finance for investment since the firms 
can be facing a crisis of bankruptcy if they failed to finance for working capital while failure to raise capital for 
investment is usually not the direct cause of bankruptcy. Therefore, the firms that need to finance for working capital 
should be more motivated for earnings management than that need to finance for investment capital. Based on these 
ideas, this study establishes Hypothesis 2 & 3 as follows and analyzes them.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The firms that finance by SEO conduct more earnings management before financing than the firms that 
finance by BOND. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The firms that finance by SEO for working capital conduct more earnings management before financing 
than the firms that finance for investment capital. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The firms that finance by BOND for working capital conduct more earnings management before 
financing than the firms that finance for investment capital. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
This paper analyzes earnings management by adjusting discretionary accruals. In earnings management researches, 
the most used measures are Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) and Performance Matched Model (Kothari 
et al., 2005) to estimate discretionary accruals. This study measures earnings management using Performance Matched 
Model. Ball & Shivakumar (2008) argued errors occur when measuring discretionary accruals of growth firms and 
extreme performance firms using Modified Jones Model. It is plausible that firms issuing equity and/or bonds have 
high growth and/or extreme performance. To verify the Hypotheses, regression models are set up which have 
discretionary accruals before financing as dependent variable and DUMMY variables as main variables which mean 
SEO vs. BOND, Working Capital vs. Investment Capital. LEV is included to control firms’ financial stability and GW 
is included to control firms’ growth opportunity. CFO is a variable to control firms’ profitability, SIZE is included to 
control firms’ size effect, and LOSS is included to control accruals property. 
 
Performance Matched Model 
 
TAt /TAt-1=β0+β1(1/At-1)+β2(△REVt -△ARt )/At-1+β3(PPEt /At-1)+β4ROAt+εt  (1) 
 
TA: Total Accruals 
A: Total Assets 
△REV: Changes in Revenue = △REVt-△REVt-1 
△AR: Changes in Account Receivable = △ARt-△ARt-1 
PPE: Property, Plant, and Equipment 
ROA: Return on Assets 
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Research Model 
 
DAt-1 = β0+β1SEOt+β2LEVt-1+β3GWt-1+β4CFOt-1+β5SIZEt-1+β6LOSSt-1+ΣYD+ΣIND+εt-1 (2) 
 
DA:  Discretionary Accruals measured by Kothari et al. (2005) 
SEO:  1 if financed by Seasoned Equity Offerings, 0 if financed by Issuing Bonds 
LEV:  Leverage=Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
GW:  Growth=ΔSales scaled by Total Assets 
CFO:  Cash Flows from Operating scaled by Total Assets 
SIZE:  The natural logarithm of the Total Assets 
LOSS:  The earnings < 0 then 1, otherwise 0 
YD:  Year Dummy 
IND:  Industry Dummy 
 
 
DAt-1 = β0+β1WC_SEOt+β2LEVt-1+β3GWt-1+β4CFOt-1+β5SIZEt-1+β6LOSSt-1+ΣYD+ΣIND+εt-1 (3) 
 
WC_SEO: 1 if financed by SEO for Working Capital, 0 if financed by SEO for Investment Capital. 
 
 
DAt-1 =β0+β1WC_BONDt+β2LEVt-1+β3GWt-1+β4CFOt-1+β5SIZEt-1+β6LOSSt-1+ΣYD+ΣIND+εt-1 (4) 
 
WC_BOND: 1 if financed by BOND for Working Capital, 0 if financed by BOND for Investment Capital. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 1 is descriptive statistics of total 2,240 samples. Mean of DA as a dependent variable is 0.004, slightly higher 
than the market average, 0. It means the firms that finance are more likely use earnings management than the total 
firms in the market. No material differences from the prior studies noted in the values of other variables. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Sample size Mean SD Median Min Max 
DA 2,240 0.004 0.068 0.000 -0.280 0.393 
SEO 2,240 0.420 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LEV 2,240 0.684 0.323 0.663 0.119 1.500 
GW 2,240 0.183 0.587 0.089 -0.754 2.071 
CFO 2,240 0.043 0.467 0.031 -0.163 0.249 
SIZE 2,240 27.246 1.785 27.227 22.114 32.183 
LOSS 2,240 0.283 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000 
See Model (2) for variables’ definition. 
 
 
Table 2 is the matrix of correlations between variables. According to the results, the firms that finance by SEO use 
more earnings management since the correlation between DA and SEO is significantly positive.  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2016 Volume 32, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1874 The Clute Institute 
Table 2. Pearson correlation matrix 
Variables DA SEO LEV GW CFO SIZE LOSS 
DA 1       
SEO 0.132*** 1      
LEV 0.011 0.004 1     
GW 0.023 0.013 0.292*** 1    
CFO -0.157*** -0.075*** 0.238*** 0.215*** 1   
SIZE -0.126*** -0.396*** 0.084*** 0.012 0.148*** 1  
LOSS 0.048** 0.148*** 0.001 -0.022 -0.109*** -0.172*** 1 
See Model (2) for variables’ definition. 
*, **, and *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the univariate analysis results of three hypotheses. Firms that finance for working capital appear to use 
more earnings management before financing. 
 
 
Table 3. T-test 
DA DUMMY=1 DUMMY=0 Difference 
SEO; SEO vs. BOND 
(Sample size) 
0.014 
(940) 
-0.004 
(1,300) 0.018
*** 
WC_SEO; Working Capital vs. Investment Capital (SEO) 
(Sample size) 
0.020 
(781) 
-0.013 
(159) 0.033
*** 
WC_BOND; Working Capital vs. Investment Capital (BOND) 
(Sample size) 
0.001 
(1,169) 
-0.038 
(131) 0.038
*** 
See Model (2), (3), and (4)’ for variables’ definition. 
*, **, and *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4 shows regression analysis results that support Hypotheses. In panel A, the coefficient (0.010) of firms that 
finance by SEO is positive at a significance level of 1% (t value=2.96), which suggests that the firms finance by SEO 
use more earnings management before financing than the firms finance by issuing bonds. Regression analysis result 
seems to support Hypothesis 1. In panel B, the coefficient (0.028) of firms that finance by SEO for Working Capital 
is positive at a significance level of 1% (t value=4.32), which suggests that the firms finance by SEO for Working 
Capital use more earnings management before financing than the firms finance by SEO for Investment Capital. 
Regression analysis result seems to support Hypothesis 2. In panel C, the coefficient (0.031) of firms that finance by 
BOND for Working Capital is positive at a significance level of 1% (t value=5.46), which suggests that the firms 
finance by BOND for Working Capital use more earnings management before financing than firms finance by BOND 
for Investment Capital. Regression analysis result seems to support Hypothesis 3. No material differences from the 
prior studies noted in the values of other control variables. In every analysis, VIF values are lower than 10, therefore, 
there is no issue with multicollinearity. 
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Table 4. Regression analysis for hypotheses 
DAt-1 = β0+β1DUMMYt+β2LEVt-1+β3GWt-1+β4CFOt-1+β5SIZEt-1+β6LOSSt-1+ΣYD+ΣIND+εt-1   (2), (3), (4) 
 
 Panel A: Hypothesis 1 DUMMY = SEO 
Panel A: Hypothesis 2 
DUMMY = WC_SEO 
Panel A: Hypothesis 3 
DUMMY = WC_BOND 
Variables Parameter Estimate t value VIF 
Parameter 
Estimate t value VIF 
Parameter 
Estimate t value VIF 
Intercept 0.066 2.35** 0.000 0.065 1.55 0.000 0.032 0.81 0.000 
DUMMY 0.010 2.96*** 1.401 0.028 4.32*** 1.199 0.031 5.46*** 1.114 
LEV 0.009 12.74*** 3.900 0.008 7.75*** 5.471 0.009 7.70*** 2.835 
GW 0.001 0.11 1.110 -0.001 -0.37 1.116 0.001 2.99*** 1.998 
CFO -0.084 -14.66*** 3.829 -0.072 -8.37*** 5.357 -0.103 -12.95*** 2.477 
SIZE -0.003 -3.05*** 1.532 -0.004 -2.45** 1.365 -0.002 -1.56 1.579 
LOSS -0.008 -2.42*** 1.197 -0.018 -3.56*** 1.265 0.001 0.15 1.103 
YD Included Included Included 
IND Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.106 0.108 0.143 
F value 7.61*** 3.83*** 6.40*** 
Sample size 2,240 940 1,300 
See Model (2), (3), and (4)’, and ‘Table 3’ for variables’ definition. 
VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. 
*, **, and *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examined the difference of earnings management before financing by capital financing purposes. This 
study verified whether the firms that need to finance for working capital are more motivated for earnings management 
than the firms that need to finance for investment capital. The results show that discretionary accruals before financing 
for working capital are greater than financing for investment capital for both SEO and BOND. Academically, this 
study contributes to verify the difference of earnings management by financing purposes of SEO and BOND. There 
have been a lot of studies regarding the entire SEO and/or BOND, however, studies in detailed SEO and/or BOND by 
financing purposes are rarely found. Practical contributions of this study are that it suggests the firms which 
implemented earnings management before financing, especially for working capital, the effects should be reflected to 
the prices upon issuing equity and/or bonds. Moreover, audit needs to be done in even stricter manner, reflecting the 
consequences of earnings management before financing, specifically for working capital. 
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